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Truthmakers Without Truth1 
RÖGNVALDUR INGTHORSSON 
 
 
It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, neces-
sarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true 
that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I ar-
gue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent real-
ists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The as-
sumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, de-
termine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth is independent of 
minds. This follows only on the further assumption that there exist proposi-
tions about every feature of reality independent of minds, which is some-
thing the immanent realist can and should deny.  
 
I 
mong proponents of the correspondence theory, J.M.E. McTaggart be-
ing the outstanding exception (1927, sect. 15ff), it is almost univer-
sally assumed that the correspondence theory of truth is wedded to the idea 
that truth is mind-independent.2 That is, it is believed that, necessarily, if 
the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is 
that way, independently of anyone thinking or speaking about the way the 
world is. In this paper I will argue that the correspondence theory is not 
wedded to the idea that truth is mind-independent. Furthermore, that in 
particular those philosophers who restrict the scope of reality to the spatio-
temporal world, i.e. immanent realists or naturalists, can and should reject 
the mind-independence view. This discussion is wholly concerned with the 
correspondence theory of truth, and its implications.  
                                                
1This paper was written with financial support from STINT–The Swedish Foundation 
for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education, for which I am 
deeply grateful. Thanks also to all those anonymous referees and participants in re-
search seminars at the University of Durham and Umeå University who have com-
mented earlier versions of this paper and forced me to think, and think again. Special 
thanks to Jonathan Lowe and Ingvar Johansson for constructive critique and support. 
2 The content of this paper is greatly inspired by J.M.E. McTaggart’s reasoning in 
(1927, sect. 15 ff). 
A 
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The correspondence theory, in its broadest sense, is the view that truth is 
a relation to reality (Marian David, 1994: 17). More narrowly, the theory 
construes truth as a relational property of propositions, which they bear in 
virtue of a certain kind of relation to a determinate state of a portion of re-
ality, i.e. a state of affairs, or fact. A fact, accordingly, is a portion of real-
ity as that portion is in itself, independently of how we think it is. Since at 
least one of the relata of the correspondence relation is mind-independent, 
the correspondence relation is assumed to hold whether we know it to hold 
or not; in the words of Ingvar Johansson (2004), it is cognition-
independent. To sum up, correspondence-truth requires a fact at one end of 
the correspondence relation, e.g., the sun as it is in itself, but also some-
thing at the other end of the relation. Something distinct from the sun itself, 
but which is about the sun, and which corresponds to it or is somehow 
made true by the sun, say, the proposition ‘the sun is a star’.3 Truth, ac-
cording to the correspondence theory, is correspondence of proposition to 
fact, or, of truthbearer to truthmaker.4 In the words of J. L. Austin: “It 
takes two to make a truth” (1964: 23).  
Proponents of correspondence-truth, and others, usually take it for 
granted that truth is independent of what we think or say. I will call this the 
mind-independence intuition. I call it an intuition because when used ex-
plicitly as an argument, typically, the reader is asked to accept as self-
evident some suggestion about what would be true even if no one was 
thinking about it. For instance, that if it were a fact that the sun is a star, it 
would be true that the sun is a star even if there did not exist beings able to 
think or express ‘the sun is a star’. The following passage by Scott Soames 
is a typical example of the kind of reasoning I have in mind: 
Certainly a proposition can be true even if it has never been expressed by 
any actual utterance. It is also not absurd to suppose that it can be true even 
if there is no sentence that expresses it. For example, for each of the nonde-
numerably many real numbers, there is a proposition that it is greater than 
or equal to zero. If each sentence is a finite string of words drawn from a fi-
nite vocabulary, then the number of propositions outstrips the denumerable 
infinity of sentences available to express them - that is, there are truths with 
no linguistic expression. Moreover, if languages are man-made construc-
                                                
3 I will henceforth use single quotation marks to refer to propositional content, as op-
posed to that which the content professes to be about. 
4 Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, & Barry Smith initiated the use of ’truthmakers’ and 
’truthbearers’ as general terms for that which determines the truth-value of something, 
and that which has the truth-value, respectively (1984: 287-321).  
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tions, then propositions that are expressed by sentences could have been 
true even if no sentences had expressed them. For example the proposition 
that the sun is a star could have been true even if no one and hence no sen-
tence had existed to express it (1999: 19). 
According to Soames, there exist propositions that have no linguistic ex-
pression because there is a greater infinity of propositions than there are 
linguistic expressions. The passage also clearly illustrates that the mind-
independence intuition of truth is closely linked to another idea also widely 
taken for granted by contemporary philosophers, notably that propositions 
exist independently of minds. Soames clearly assumes that propositions are 
mind-independent and therefore exist whether or not anyone thinks or ex-
presses them. Indeed, he further strengthens his claim that there are some 
propositions that have no linguistic expression, by advancing the point that 
if there were no thinking beings, no proposition at all would have a linguis-
tic expression, not even those that are presently expressed by sentences, 
and yet, he suggests they could be true. I interpret the contingency of the 
truth of the proposition ‘the sun exists’, implied by the term ‘could’, not as 
due to the contingent existence of propositions, but to the contingency of 
the existence of the sun; i.e. to the contingency of the truthmaker, not the 
truthbearer. If the sun did not exist, the proposition ‘the sun exists’ would 
still exist, but be false. However, if the existence of propositions were con-
tingent, then Soames argument would fail since there would be no guaran-
tee that for every real number there would be the proposition ‘x is greater 
than or equal to zero’. Soames’ main point is surely to show that it is only 
a matter of contingent fact that propositions have linguistic expressions at 
all, while it is assumed to be a matter of objective necessity that there exist 
propositions about every feature of reality, whether actual or merely possi-
ble, and that are therefore true or false independently of minds.  
It is still a matter of some controversy whether or not one should as-
sume that propositions exist independently of minds (for an overview, see 
Rosen 2001), even though contemporary philosophers do not seem to be 
particularly worried about this controversy. In general, philosophers take it 
for granted that it would be of no significant importance to assume, for the 
sake of convenience, that there exist propositions about everything, inde-
pendently of minds. There is even a name for the assumption that for all 
being, there is a proposition (not necessarily thought by anyone) that truly 
renders the nature of this being. Stephen Read calls it expressibility (2000). 
Of course, if truth is correspondence between proposition and fact, and if 
propositions exist independently of minds, then propositions can be true or 
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false independently of being thought or expressed by someone. I do not 
dispute that. What I object to is the assumption that it is somehow self-
evident, or unproblematic to assume, that propositions do in fact exist in-
dependently of minds. 
Let us consider another example of the impact of the mind-
independence intuition in contemporary philosophy, notably Hugh Mel-
lor’s abandonment of his token-reflexive account of the truth-conditions of 
tensed propositions, i.e. A-propositions: 
 
In Real Time I defended the token-reflexive view that an A-proposition like 
‘e is present’ is true at a B-time t if and only if a token of it - e.g., a state-
ment of it, or someone’s belief in it - at t would be true. But Quentin Smith 
(1993a chapter 3) and others have shown that this cannot cope with propo-
sitions like ‘there are no tokens now’, which can be true even though they 
can have no true tokens (1998: xi-xii). 
 
For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to know the details of the 
token-reflexive analysis, it is enough to know that the existence at a par-
ticular time of a particular instance (token) of a tensed proposition, i.e. a 
sentence, an utterance or a thought, is an essential part of the truth-
condition of that very proposition. Mellor, agrees to the idea shared by 
Quentin Smith, Soames and every proponent of ‘expressibility’, that 
propositions can be true even though there is no one to think or express 
them. He draws the conclusion that his account is inadequate because it 
cannot account for the truth-conditions of propositions that cannot have 
any true instances, and yet be true when no instances of it exist, such as 
‘there are no linguistic tokens now’.  
The suggestion that when there are no thinking beings, and hence no 
linguistic tokens, it would be true that ‘there are no linguistic tokens’ is by 
no means justified by the correspondence theory. The correspondence the-
ory does not say that, necessarily, for every feature of reality, whether ac-
tual or merely possible, there is a proposition about it, which can be true or 
false by corresponding to fact. It is perfectly compatible with the corre-
spondence theory to deny the reality of Platonic propositions, and hence to 
say that when there are no thinking beings it is a matter of objective fact 
that there are no linguistic tokens and it is a matter of objective fact that 
there are no propositions either that could correspond to that fact. Accord-
ingly, it would be a matter of objective fact that there are no truths about 
the lack of linguistic tokens, when in fact linguistic tokens are lacking. 
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When in fact there are no linguistic tokens, on this view, there will be no 
correspondence-truth, in the form of propositions bearing the relational 
property of truth. To my mind, then, Mellor’s token reflexive analysis is 
perfectly adequate because I only see a need to account for the truth of 
propositions that actually exist.  
II 
 
The idea that there will be no truth unless there exist thinking creatures 
able to form propositions about the determinate states of the world, will 
strike many readers as being highly provocative and counter-intuitive, even 
absurd or at least implying numerous difficulties. For instance, it might be 
received as analogous to the idea that ‘to be is to be perceived’. That is, the 
claim that there will be no truth about the sun being a star unless the 
proposition ‘the sun is a star’ exists in the mind of a thinking being, could 
be understood as an analogous to the idea that there are no trees in the for-
est unless someone perceives the trees. The worry is that by denying the 
existence of truths about the sun, one is denying the existence of a mind-
independent reality. This worry is unfounded. A world devoid of thinking 
beings would still be a world of many determinate states of affairs, i.e. 
facts, even though it lacked entities that were about these facts, and which 
held a relation of correspondence to them. It would be a world that did not 
contain anything that corresponded to the ways the world is; it would be a 
world that only contained the ways the world is, period. Indeed, I suspect 
that it is the conviction that many things exist that are never thought of that 
lends credibility to the mind-independence intuition, because when we try 
to imagine what it would be like for something to be true in the absence of 
thinkers, we imagine what it would be like for something to exist in the ab-
sence of thinkers. Or, in other words, we consider whether the truthmaker 
of that proposition could exist in the absence of thinkers. From the conclu-
sion that the truthmaker could exist in the absence of thinking beings, we 
are tempted to draw the further conclusion that truth is independent of 
minds, because the existence of the truthmaker is thought to entail or ne-
cessitate truth. This last inference is mistaken, or, at least, dependent on 
further assumptions, which will be discussed in section III below. 
The idea that truth and objective reality are somehow inseparable has a 
strong hold on philosophers, wherefore there is reason to dwell on this 
point a bit further. The main culprit behind the allure of the mind-
independence intuition could be the idea that because the truth-value of 
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propositions is determined by the facts, then truth is intimately connected 
with how the world is in itself. Having the idea that facts determine truth in 
the back of one’s mind, and of course the conviction that truth is neverthe-
less a property of propositions, the following line of reasoning comes natu-
rally: (i) if snow is in fact white, then it must be true that snow is white re-
gardless of anyone thinking ‘snow is white’, because truth is about how 
things are in themselves not about how they are thought of by an observer, 
and (ii) there must then necessarily be the corresponding proposition ‘snow 
is white’ if snow is in fact white, otherwise there would be no truth about 
how things are in themselves, given that truth is a property of propositions, 
and (iii) that if it is denied that there would be truth in the absence of 
thinkers, this is received as tantamount to denying that there is any such 
thing as how things are in themselves because this is what truth is all 
about. The conclusion that unless there is truth there is no determinate real-
ity does not follow from the correspondence theory, because although truth 
is intimately connected to how the world is, it is not equivalent to how the 
world is. Truth, according to the correspondence theory, is a property of 
propositions about the world, a property they possess in virtue of a relation 
of correspondence to the world; truth is not a property of the world itself. 
Hence we can have a determinate objective reality without truth. This 
should calm the jitters of immanent realists about the suggestion that truth 
is mind-dependent, at least to some extent.  
It should be pointed out that even on this kind of mind-dependence view 
of truth, truth is not subjective. It only depicts the existence of propositions 
to be mind-dependent, but the truth of these mind-dependent propositions 
is still determined by the world. A proposition is still true in virtue of the 
facts, even though it does not exist in virtue of the facts. Furthermore, it 
would be entirely besides the point to object that an objective feature of the 
world would not be a truthmaker unless it made something true. The objec-
tive features of the world are popularly called ‘truthmakers’, only because 
it appears to be taken for granted that, necessarily, if something exists in-
dependently of minds, then there is a proposition about it and which is 
made true by that something. To my mind, this is not self-evident at all, 
and I continue to use the term ‘truthmaker’ merely for the sake of conven-
ience. 
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III 
 
The mind-independence intuition of correspondence-truth is dependent on 
the assumption that for every feature of reality there exists a corresponding 
proposition independently of minds. This is of particular importance for 
what is called immanent realism, or natural realism, the view that reality is 
confined to the spatiotemporal world, because they explicitly reject the re-
ality of entities existing outside time and space, i.e. platonic propositions. 
Immanent realism is difficult to reconcile with the mind-independence in-
tuition of truth because it is difficult to reconcile it with the mind-
independence of propositions. Indeed, I think immanent realists can and 
should reject both the mind-independence of propositions and of truth.  
Please note that immanent realism is not equivalent to nominalism, ac-
cording to which there are no universals. Immanent realism does admit 
universals, in the form of universal features of things existing in the spatio-
temporal world. Note also that immanent realism is not incompatible with 
the existence of abstract concepts, it just insist that they must exist in some 
form of material substratum, e.g. in the form of mental states in the minds 
of thinkers, mental states whose content is abstract. According to this view 
the universal property of being true exists in its instances, i.e. in the rela-
tional properties of those existing propositions that correspond to their sub-
ject matter.  
I must also warn the reader not to understand the mind-dependence 
view of propositions as suggesting that propositions flicker in and out of 
existence as people shift their attention from considering one proposition to 
considering the next. There is a common-sense inspired idea about having 
beliefs, which fits naturally to the immanent realist view, and which ap-
pears to be the view adopted by every empirically orientated view on men-
tal content, e.g. in psychology. This is the idea that our mind contains 
‘propositional content’ in many different forms, some of which we need 
not always be conscious of having in order for that content to be firmly 
situated in the brain. Knowledge, memories and internalised attitudes are 
obvious examples. It would be contrary to common sense to assume that 
knowledge never really exists in the mind except for those brief moments 
when we intentionally direct our attention towards it. Admittedly, our ca-
pacity to be conscious of the contents of our minds is greatly limited, but 
our capacity to store knowledge in our minds is extraordinary. Just con-
sider persons who remember the telephone book from front to back. Not to 
think of those that really know what Kant’s transcendental philosophy is 
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all about. Should we seriously consider the possibility that these persons 
merely have an extraordinary capacity to have the appropriate intentional 
stance to something existing outside time and space? If anything is, then 
this is a view that runs counter to common sense. Arguably, knowledge, 
memories and internalised attitudes are a few of many types of mental 
items, which can exist subconsciously, but never independently of a mind.  
I have no illusions about the mind-dependency view of propositions be-
ing unproblematic. Some of these problems will be discussed in subse-
quent sections. For now, let me point out that I assume that there is no 
lesser mystery involved in the assumption that propositional content exists 
only in some form of material substratum, e.g. organic brains (whether it 
be in the form of conscious thoughts, immediate experience, knowledge, 
memories or internalised attitudes), than in the assumption that proposi-
tional content only exist in the form of immaterial eternal entities located 
outside space and time. The most important thing here to note is that this 
discussion does not concern the existence of propositional content, or even 
of abstract propositional content. In the background there is the question of 
where and in what form propositional content exists, but here the focus is 
on the philosophical consequences either of assuming that this content ex-
ists only in minds and products of minds, or if it exists outside time and 
space. 
Contemporary adherents of immanent realism do not all explicitly en-
dorse a mind-independency view of propositions, but implicitly many of 
them do. This is evident in discussions concerning the so-called truthmaker 
principle. The principle, in its simplest form, merely states that for every 
truth there is a truthmaker, and I have no qualms about that. This is just a 
slogan expressing the idea that facts determine the truth-value of proposi-
tions. But, a number of thinkers have felt a need to add what is meant to be 
a corollary, supposedly explaining, or completing, the principle. John Fox 
initially states the principle as follows: “for every truth there is a truth-
maker; by a truthmaker for A, I mean something whose very existence en-
tails A” (1987: 188-207). Fox then notes that according to standard usage 
only propositions entail, and suggests that ’necessitate’, in a non-causal 
sense, is better (1987: 125). Transcribing the principle in accordance with 
his suggestion we have the following formulation: ‘a truthmaker for A, is 
something whose very existence necessitates A’. The corollary says that 
the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the existence of a true proposi-
tion, and I assume that this necessity is supposed to hold regardless of the 
contingent existence of thinkers/speakers. The existence of the truthmaker 
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is in any case presented as the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of the truthbearer.  
Others have suggested very similar formulations of the truthmaker prin-
ciple, e.g. Bigelow (1988: 125).5 One should of course be careful in ascrib-
ing a mind-independency view to immanent realists, as opposed to merely 
complain about imprecision in the formulation, since this threatens to as-
cribe to them sympathy for platonic entities. It is clear however that in his 
latest work, David Armstrong is well aware of the problem of combining 
immanent realism and a mind-independence view of truth. He explicitly 
seeks to establish the mind-independency of truth within immanent real-
ism.  
Armstrong has endorsed the truthmaker principle for some time now, 
but it is only recently that he has explicitly addressed the problem being 
discussed here. In A World of States of Affairs he states that “the truth-
maker for a truth must necessitate that truth” (1997, p. 115), which could 
be read as saying merely that the truth of a proposition, if it exists at all, is 
necessitated, but not the existence of the proposition itself. However, in 
Truth and Truthmakers Armstrong strengthens his claims, making it clear 
that he endorses a mind-independence view of truth. He first says that the 
relation is “absolute necessitation” (2004: 5), and somewhat later that “[…] 
the conglomeration of H2O molecules at a certain place and time (the 
truthmaker) necessitates that <there is water at that place and time> (the 
truth) […]” (2004: 6). Finally, he suggests the following working hypothe-
sis about the nature of truth: 
 
p (a proposition) is true if and only if there exists a T (some entity in the 
world) such that T necessitates that p and p is true in virtue of T (2004: 17) 
 
To my mind this clearly indicates that a truthmaker, on Armstrong’s view, 
is something that necessitates both that a proposition exists and that it is 
true.  
                                                
5 So have opponents to correspondence e.g. Julian Dodd (2002) and David Lewis 
(2001), then in order to criticise it, but not on the same grounds as me. Dodd criticises 
it for not specifying whether it is the mere existence of something, or the particular 
qualitative state of the thing, that is the truthmaker proper. Lewis uses this formulation 
of the truthmaker principle to argue that the correspondence-theory is not about truth 
at all, but about the existential groundings of truthmakers themselves. There are then 
other reasons to be wary of the formulation than the one I present. 
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The conviction that the truthmaking relation is a matter of absolute ne-
cessitation is all the more troublesome for Armstrong since he finds the 
suggestion plausible that there could be a physical world without minds. 
Indeed, he uses this possibility as an argument against phenomenalism. 
According to phenomenalism, sense-data serve the role of truthmakers. 
But, in a world empty of minds, Armstrong argues, the phenomenalist must 
give a counterfactual analysis of every physical truth in terms of sense-data 
not actually had by anything. That is, the phenomenalist’s own conclusion 
should be that in such a world there are no truthmakers for truths about a 
physical world, and hence no physical world (2004: 2). Now, the argument 
is powerful against phenomenalism, since they consider mind-dependent 
sense-data to be the truthmakers of truths about mind-independent facts, 
and those truthmakers disappear if sentient beings disappear.  
Armstrongs admission that a world without minds is a real possibility 
threatens to backfire, when he assumes truth to be mind-independent. To 
claim that facts necessitate propositions and admit that thinkers are contin-
gent beings makes it hard to deny the existence of Platonic entities. And 
yet Armstrong resists that consequence. He professes to look for a “this-
worldly account of propositions” (2004: 12). At first he suggests that 
propositions are the ‘intentional objects’ of thoughts and beliefs, but hesi-
tates to speculate too deeply about the metaphysical nature of these inten-
tional objects. Nevertheless, he is forced to do just that because he recog-
nises the problem with being an immanent realist and claiming that truth is 
mind-independent. An immanent realist needs a this-worldly account of 
propositions, but this-worldly accounts of propositions that exist independ-
ently of minds are hard to find. Initially, Armstrong, like me, identifies the 
possibility of construing them as representational states of minds as the 
natural this-worldly choice (2004: 14).  But, to him, this is unsatisfactory:  
 
Cannot there be truths which nobody has or will believe, or even formulate, 
much less state? Consider Newton and his image of the ocean of undiscov-
ered truth that he said lay before him, reaching far beyond his own discov-
eries. We understand this well enough, and would continue to understand it 
even in the absence of an all-knowing creator or the ocean of truth yielding 
up all its secrets in the future. We may call such truths unexpressed truths. 
Generalising to include falsehoods, we can speak of ‘unexpressed proposi-
tions’. True unexpressed propositions will be truths without any concrete 
truthbearers […] They are, for me at least, conceptually very important. The 
reason for this is that the concept of such truths is needed to make sense of 
Truthmaker Necessitarianism (2004: 15).  
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Realising that he needs mind-independent propositions, Armstrong has to 
modify the initial idea about propositions as intentional objects, so that 
they no longer are dependent on being thought of or expressed by minds. 
His suggestion is that unexpressed propositions are possibilities of believ-
ing or contemplating or linguistically expressing the unexpressed proposi-
tion, i.e. he appeals to ‘expressibility’.  
 Armstrong is stretching his immanent realism to the limits, and he is 
well aware of this. One particularly interesting worry discussed by himself 
is the danger of introducing uninstantiated properties into his ontology in 
the form of the uninstantiated content of an unexpressed proposition. Arm-
strong hopes that a deflationary account of these uninstantiated properties 
can be given, by equating them with the mere possibility of the instantia-
tion of such a property. But, he does not mention the danger of making 
truth itself an uninstantiated property. When in fact there are no thinking 
beings, and hence no expressed propositions, there will be no concrete 
truthbearers actually bearing the relational property of being true. Arm-
strong admits as much. He admits that truthmakers can only actually ne-
cessitate possible intentional objects, which, were they to be actually real-
ised by minds, could actually bear the property of corresponding to its sub-
ject matter (2004: 16).  
To my mind, even though we admit that in the absence of minds there 
still exists the mere possibility of expressing a proposition about some fact, 
i.e. there exists an unexpressed proposition, which would have corre-
sponded to its subject matter in case it had been expressed, then the lack of 
an actual truthbearer is equal to the absence of truth. There would be the 
possibility of truth, but no truth; possibility is not equivalent to an actual-
ity. There would be no truth in the very same way as there would be no 
thinkers, and there would be the possibility of truth in the very same way 
as there would be the possibility of being thinkers. Indeed, unless there was 
the possibility of there being thinkers there would not be the possibility of 
there being expressed propositions, and that would seem to cancel the exis-
tence of unexpressed propositions.  
I disagree with Armstrong about the mind-independence of truth, but 
my reason for disagreeing with him is not because I find his theory unintel-
ligible or inconsistent. I disagree because I do not share his enthusiasm for 
preserving truth at all cost, for two reasons. Firstly, for the sake of onto-
logical economy. To assume that mind-independent reality consists only of 
determinate states of the world, and the possible ways the world could be 
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different than it in fact is, seems more economical than to assume that in 
addition it consists of possible ways of believing or contemplating or lin-
guistically express the ways the world is or could be, even when there are 
no thinkers that could have believed or contemplated these ways. Espe-
cially since it is doubtful whether this assumption can establish that when 
there are no minds there are still actual truths; it can only establish the exis-
tence of the mere possibility of the instantiation of truths. It can only estab-
lish the necessary conditions for truth, but not sufficient conditions.  
Secondly, I fail to see that it has been established beyond doubt that we 
need to assume that truth is mind-independent. For instance, we could say 
that what Newton intended to say, but formulated badly, was that there is 
an ocean of undiscovered facts (not truths) waiting to be discovered; there 
are innumerably many facets of the nature of mind-independent reality 
about which we know nothing and have no idea about. To deny that there 
is an ocean of undiscovered truths is not to deny that there is an ocean of 
undiscovered facts. Indeed, what does a scientist aim to discover? Does a 
physicist aim to discover all the unexpressed propositions that exist inde-
pendently of her mind, or does she aim to discover the unknown determi-
nate states and properties of the mind-independent world, and the laws of 
nature?  
In the case of empirical truth, it is admittedly easier to accept that there 
could be facts without truth. If that was the only kind of truths we have, 
Armstrong would perhaps be more easily persuaded to abandon the mind-
independence view of truth.  I think however that where Armstrong feels 
the need for mind-independent truth to be greatest is not in relation to con-
tingent truths, or empirical truths, but in relation to questions about neces-
sary truths, or modal truths in general. I will discuss this matter in greater 
detail in the next section. 
Armstrong finds truthmaker necessitarianism intuitively appealing, be-
cause he thinks truth is about how things are in themselves, and seeks to 
modify his immanent realism to fit that view. I find immanent realism in-
tuitively appealing and would rather modify my view of truth to fit that 
view. I find it more plausible to think (like McTaggart (1927), and Johans-
son (2004)) that the relata of the truth-making relation can exist independ-
ently of each other, and hence that the truthmaking relation involves no ex-
istential necessity, but that when they both exist the truthmaker necessarily 
makes the truthbearer true. Accordingly, propositions are true in virtue of a 
fact, but this does not imply that the proposition exists in virtue of a fact. 
Immanent realists clearly should not accept principles that threaten to 
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commit them to the existence of Platonic entities or of something in the 
neighbourhood, like the existence of a mere possibility of the instantiation 
of a proposition about the mere possibility of the instantiation of a state of 
affairs. That is, to the existence of unexpressed propositions about possible 
but never realised states of affairs.  
A final observation about the truthmaker principle is that on the formu-
lation being discussed here the alleged ‘corollary’ is no corollary, i.e. it 
should not be understood as a further explanation or clarification of the 
claim that for every truth there is a truthmaker. The principle says that for 
every truth there is a truthmaker, but the ‘corollary’ says that for every 
truthmaker there is a truth. I agree to the former, but I disagree that the lat-
ter should follow from, or explain, the former. The former is based on the 
idea that the truth-value of propositions is determined by the facts, but the 
second is based on the idea that, necessarily, if there exists a fact there also 
exists the corresponding proposition, i.e. on expressibility. There is no self-
evident connection between the two.  
IV 
 
I have already made one suggestion as to why philosophers may find the 
mind-dependency of truth counterintuitive. Notably, because they associate 
truth with how things are in themselves and therefore find the claim that 
truth is mind-dependent to be equivalent to the claim that how things are in 
themselves is dependent on minds. I detect traces of this in Armstrong’s 
work. As soon as he writes about how the physical world is, he does this in 
terms of physical truths, as if the physical world and truth are somehow 
equivalent or that the physical world somehow manifests truth. This is of 
course in line with his truthmaker necessitarianism, according to which a 
fact necessitates the existence of a proposition or unexpressed proposition. 
But even on that account there is a distinction between truthmaker and 
truthbearer; ontologically speaking truth is not identical with being even on 
Armstrong’s account. There is also the suggestion by Bigelow that truth, at 
least contingent truth, supervenes on being (1988: ch. 19), which has af-
finities with the earlier mentioned ‘expressibility’. The general idea is that 
necessarily, if the world is a certain way, it gives rise to truths about it. 
Now, I think I have convincingly argued for the point that to deny that 
there is truth in the absence of thinkers is not equivalent to rejecting that 
there are facts in the absence of thinkers. Immanent realists should there-
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fore not be overly worried about rejecting reality when rejecting truth. But 
there are other worries. 
One is the issue of analytic truth, which is generally regarded as a kind 
of truth that require no truthmaker, e.g. mathematical truths. Now, I have 
nothing further to add to what Armstrong says on this matter. I completely 
agree with him that even for these truths it is possible to find suitable this-
worldly truthmakers. There is admittedly no particular concrete state of af-
fairs which is the truthmaker of ‘2+2=4’, but I do not see why general fea-
tures of the world, e.g. of how objects form sets (by fiat or because of natu-
ral boundaries or bonds), could not be truth-makers of abstract propositions 
(Armstrong 2004: ch. 8 & 9).6 How are we otherwise to understand the 
idea that mathematically formulated natural laws are true by virtue of cor-
rectly describing a general feature of reality? If ‘E = m x c2‘ is true, this is 
surely because it is a correct description of the relationship between the en-
ergy, mass, and velocity of any object whatsoever. It is definitely not true 
by correspondence to one particular concrete state of affairs, not true 
purely in virtue of its meaning, the laws of logic and/or mathematics.  
Assuming, then, that there are this-worldly truthmakers of mathematical 
truths, then to deny that ‘7 + 5 = 12’ would still be true even in the absence 
of minds does not entail that there is something subjective in the way 
mind-independent objects form sets. It is just to deny that in the absence of 
thinkers there would still be propositions about the way they form sets.  
To reject mind-independent truth also has disturbing consequences for 
those who understand modalities, here confined to necessity, in terms of 
what is true in all possible worlds. The worry might be stated as follows. If 
a necessary truth is one that is true in all possible worlds and there are pos-
sible worlds in which there are no minds, then, on the mind-dependency 
view of truth there are possible worlds in which it is not true, say, that ‘2 + 
2 = 4’. Consequently ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is not necessarily true and from this it 
would seem to follow that 2 + 2 is not necessarily 4, which it plainly is. 
However, the necessity of 2 + 2 = 4, can be accounted for in the absence of 
true propositions about this modal fact. Notably by pointing out that very 
plausibly, even though there are some worlds where there are no proposi-
tions at all, there is no possible world where two objects joined with two 
other objects amount to anything else than 4 objects. Very plausibly, this is 
a necessary fact, even though it is not necessary that there exist a proposi-
                                                
6 For another concise discussion of this subject, see Lowe (2002:375 ff). 
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tion that corresponds to this fact. Consequently, it is possible to account for 
necessity without resorting to the notion of truth in all possible worlds. 
Now, it is surely possible to accommodate for some notion of ‘true in 
all possible worlds’, which would be compatible with my suggestions 
above. An anonymous referee suggested that I adopt a weaker version of 
the notion of ‘necessary truth’, e.g. as one that is true in all possible worlds 
in which the corresponding bearer of truth exists.7 Or, like Jonathan Lowe 
has suggested in conversation, that in order for a proposition to be ‘true in 
a possible world’ it is not required that there exist truth-bearers in that par-
ticular possible world with respect to which the truth of the truth-bearer is 
being evaluated.  
However, it isn’t really the ‘to be or not to be’ of the notion of necessary 
truth per se that is the issue here; it is whether necessary truth is somehow 
constitutive of, or basic to, metaphysical necessity. The initial worry was 
generated from the assumption that if there are no necessary truths, nothing 
is necessary, which has affinities with the intuition that if there is no truth 
there is no such thing as how things are in themselves. That is, it is as-
sumed that to deny that there are any necessary truths is tantamount to de-
nying that anything is necessary. This inference is invalid, and an example 
of how the mind-independence intuition of truth implicitly finds its way 
into many objections to the mind-dependency view.   
The idea that necessity should be understood in terms of truth in all 
possible worlds could be objected to on the basis that the notion of truth in 
a possible world is metaphysically dubious, even though it may have its 
justified use in modal logic. If truth is a property of propositions, in virtue 
of their correspondence to an objectively existing feature of the world, 
there is not much sense at all in talking about truth in a possible world, 
unless one is prepared to consider possible worlds as being just as existing 
and real as the actual world. If possible worlds are assumed to exist, a 
proposition existing in our world can be considered necessarily true by 
corresponding to facts in every possible world. However, if one is not 
prepared to admit this kind of existential parity of all possible worlds, 
often called modal realism (Lewis 1986), I find it difficult to motivate talk 
of truth in all possible worlds, except in the derivate sense of ‘truth’                                                 
7 The referee noted that on this view it is going to turn out that the thought that there 
are thoughts is a necessary truth. In all possible worlds in which the thought (the truth-
bearer) exists, it is true; therefore it is necessarily true according to the modified defi-
nition. But, it clearly shouldn’t turn out, on my view, that the proposition that there are 
thoughts is necessarily true. Since I do not think that truth determines necessity, I am 
not worried about this consequence.  
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all possible worlds, except in the derivate sense of ‘truth’ already discussed 
above, notably in terms of what could be thought of truly were that world 
to obtain. But, the mere possibility of the existence of a correspondence re-
lation, just in case the world had been different, is not a correspondence re-
lation and hence not a truth. Just as the possibility of losing an election, or 
having lost an election in case things had turned out otherwise, is not a lost 
election.8 However, again, the motivation behind talking about truth in a 
possible world seems to be that this is believed to be somehow equivalent 
to talking about how that possible world is, because it is assumed that if 
those worlds are in a certain way, then it would be true that they are that 
certain way.  
The suggestion that there are no necessary truths, does not entail the ab-
surd view that nothing is necessary, or that everything we have hitherto 
considered to be necessary, really isn’t. As far as I can tell, the idea that 
there are no necessary truths only questions the idea of de dicto necessary 
truths, i.e. the idea that there are propositions that are true purely in virtue 
of their meaning and the laws of logic, regardless of how the world is, e.g. 
mathematical truths. According to the immanent realist de dicto necessity 
reduces to de re necessity, which is standardly defined in terms of how 
things cannot be different than they in fact are. Or, in terms of possible 
worlds, how things are in every world where they exist. Joshua Hoffman 
and Gary Rosenkrantz offer the following account of necessity: for any en-
tity e, e is essentially (necessarily) P, just in case e is P in every world 
where e exists (1997: 3). They do not define necessity in terms of what is 
true about something in every possible world, but in terms of how that 
thing is in every possible world. This is in perfect agreement with what Kit 
Fine has earlier argued, notably that we should think that something is a 
certain way in all possible worlds, because it is essential to the thing to be 
that way, rather than thinking that something is essential because it is a cer-
tain way in all possible worlds (1994: 1-16). According to him, de re es-
sences are ontologically prior to truth in all possible worlds, and constitu-
tive of necessity, and I agree. Indeed, in this respect Armstrong holds the 
same position (2004: 95-96). 
                                                
8 According to Lewis’ modal realism even possibilities, if real at all, must be real by 
existing. Since they clearly do not exist in this world, there must be other worlds 
where they do exist. According to him, the possibility of a lost election is nothing but a 
lost election, only it is located in some other possible world than ours. 
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Arguably, necessity de re is not essentially a property of propositions, 
notably the property of being true in all possible worlds. Truth is usually 
considered to be a property of propositions, a property they owe to the 
world. So, if the truth-value of propositions is determined by the world, it 
seems natural to conclude that the only thing that could make certain 
propositions true in all possible worlds is the fact that the world is neces-
sarily in a certain way, or that all possible worlds are necessarily the same 
in some respects. Therefore, to deny mind-independent truths is not to 
deny mind-independent necessities and possibilities altogether. It is possi-
ble to think of the world has having necessary and contingent features even 
in the absence of thinking minds, propositions, and truth.  
The inclination to spell out our ideas about what is necessary in terms of 
what is true in all possible worlds, may well have to do with the idea that 
truth is somehow at the rock bottom of objectivity, or in some way identi-
cal to or equivalent to, objective reality, and that the objective features of 
reality should therefore be cashed out as truths. Consequently, there is a 
tendency to talk about propositions as being either necessary or merely 
possible, instead of talking of certain features of objective reality as being 
either necessary or contingent. But, surely, all talk about necessity and con-
tingency start from the idea that in some respects the world, or something 
in the world, could not have been otherwise than it is, while it could have 
been otherwise in other respects.9  
The intuition that, surely, many things are true that are never thought of, 
looses much of its appeal when it is realised that a fact can be conceived to 
exist without the corresponding proposition. In the same way, the idea that 
there is no necessity unless there are necessary truths (= propositions that 
are true in every possible world), looses much of its appeal when it is real-
ised that necessity does not depend for its reality on the existence of propo-
sitions that are true in every possible world. I, for one, can accept the idea 
that there are no necessary truths, as long as it does not exclude necessities 
from the world. 
V 
 
                                                
9 This, I believe, is Saul Kripke’s view. Kripke does not talk about necessities in terms 
of necessary truths, but in terms of necessary facts: ‘it will be a necessary fact about 
Nixon that in all possible worlds where he exists at all, he is human[…]’ (1980: 46). 
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I have argued that the correspondence theory in itself does not support the 
mind-independence intuition about truth. The theory is equally compatible 
with the idea that truth is also, apart from being truthmaker-dependent, 
mind-dependent. The mind-independence intuition relies on the further as-
sumption that propositions exist independently of minds. Immanent realists 
deny the reality of platonic entities and therefore should be suspicious of 
the mind-independence intuition. I have suggested that the intuitive appeal 
of the mind-independence of truth, even for those who reject the reality of 
Platonic propositions, derives from the idea that truth is determined by how 
things are in themselves. Further, I have tried to argue that the idea that 
facts determine truth does not entail that if things are as they are in them-
selves, it is true that they are that way, nor that the rejection of truth in the 
absence of thinkers is equivalent to the claim that there is no such thing as 
how things are in themselves. The main aim has been to point out what I 
think is a problem in the predominant view of correspondence-truth, held 
by immanent realists. Notably, to deny the existence of Platonic proposi-
tions and yet hold that truth is mind-independent. The conclusion is that 
immanent realists can and should abandon the corollary of the truthmaker 
principle. They should acknowledge that for every truth there is a truth-
maker but admit that there can be truthmakers in the absence of truth. 
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